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DOROTHY E. ROBERTSt 
Mary Mahowald's paper, Genetic Technologies and Their Impliwtions for 
Women,1 insightfully considers the way genetic technologies affect vvomen 
differently than men, the reasons for these differences, and whether these 
differences can or should matter. By facing women's unique biology directly, 
Professor Mahowald avoids the limits of a gender neutral approach that pre­
tends there are no differences between men and women. Workir:,t?; towards 
gender equality in the use of genetic technologies and elsewhere reqUires 
attending to the biological and power differences between the sexes. 
The Distinction Between Fairness and Fate 
What intrigued me most about Professor Mahowald's paper is its theme of 
fate and fairness. Mahowald notes that "[i]n very fundamental ways, as 
Simone de Beauvoir observed decades ago, biology informs destiny for wom­
en. "2 But understanding how biology becomes women's destiny and wheth�r 
this result is just, depends on a distinction between fate and fairness. Accord­
ing to Mahowald, certain implications of genetic technologies for women 
depend entirely on biology, while others depend on socially-determined factors 
as well.  Those that stem solely from biology are pretty much inevitable-they 
are women's fate. However, those that stem from a combination of biology 
and social causes should be subject to scrutiny to determine whether they are 
r . ra1r. 
Mahowald cites H. Tristram Englehardt's suggestion that the unequal 
distribution of physical traits among individuals is due to "failures of fortune 
rather than failures of fairness"3 and occurs "naturally, and apparently, 
inevitably."4 Although inequality that results from women's biological fate 
may be unfortunate, it is not necessarily unjust. 
tDorothy E. Roberts is a Professor of Law at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 
School of Law-Newark, S.l. Newhouse Center for Law and justice. 
1. Mary B. Mahowald, Genetic Technologies and Their Implications for Women, 3 
U Chi L Sch Roundtable 439 (1996). 
2. Id at 445 (citing Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex 33 (Knopf 1953)). 
3. Id at 454 (citing H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethlcs 340-41 
(Oxford 1986)). 
4. !d. 
.:1-65 
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Moreover, Mahowald points out that this distinction between what is 
unfortunate and what is unfair, ben;veen immutable fate and changeable 
injustice, is not the whole story. Biology cannot be unjust; but society's 
response to biological difference may be. lVIahowald explains several different 
philosophical approaches to such "namrally occurring inequality"5 and adds 
her belief that our concern for gender justice requires that ·01e should at least 
seck ro minimize gender inequality in the use of genetic rechnologies. "If 
gender jt.:stice is desirable," she concludes, "th�n effon:s should be made to re­
duce inequ::!lities occasioned by differences hetvveen the sexes. Where inequita­
ble differences are not changeable, as in the different reproductive roles of men 
and women, measures can still be introduced to reduce the gap."6 
I agree with Mahowald.  Even if we acc:pt the distinction between what is 
unfortunate and what is unfair, we cs.n work to achieve gender justice. In 
addition, however, I believe that the basic distinction berween fate and fairness 
needs to be complicated by a recognition that the very notion of "naturally 
occurring inequality" is already influenced by gender and other inequalities of 
power. Race, in particular, shapes the way our society determines which in­
equalities are "natural." Women's so-called biologically inevicable fate appears 
more changeable on closer inspection. As a result, it is more difficult to 
separate fate from fairness than Mahowald's article suggests. 
Questioning Natural Inequality 
Many social values and practices are so ingrained in our culture that they 
appear to be natural. For example, Englehardt distinguished between fate and 
fairness by pointing to unfortunate physical traits. According to Mahowald , the 
fact that "some people are more talented, more intelligent, more attractive, or 
more athletically gifted than others" did not strike Englehardt as unjust 
because such differences occur naturally.7 But none of these terms describes a 
purely natural trait; they all incorporate a social norm of beauty, intelligence, 
or talent. To say it is unfortunate that a particular woman is unattractive, for 
example, leaves unchallenged the standard that deems her particular physical 
traits to be undesirable in the first place. We could minimize the impact of the 
inequality Englehardt observed by limiting the ways social actors like employ­
ers or schools treat "naturally" unattractive people. However, we will never 
really eradicate such inequalities until we question the underlying norms that 
are themselves based on profound racial and gender inequality. 
Thus, Pecola Breedlove, the character in Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye 
who spends her childhood praying for blue eyes,8 was not just the victim of 
natural misfortune. She vvas the victim of a racist standard of beauty. As a 
little Black girl, she could never meet this standard even if by some miracle of 
5. !d. 
6. ld at 453. 
7. lei 3( 454. 
8. See generally Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (Holt, Rinehart 1970). 
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genetic technology her eyes did turn blue.9 Therefore, Engiehardt is clearly 
wrong that beauty and talent are solely matters of fortune and not fairness. 
Like all of us, Englehardt was so accustomed to the underlying norms used for 
judging what is natural that they became transparent. 
The claim that natural inequality can be demonstrated empirically does not 
resolve the issue. Tests of biological difference that now seem absurd were 
once accepted by the scientific community. In 1872, for ex:;mple, one Justice 
of the fJnited States Suprerne Court retied on -:'[tJhc natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy" of the female sex as scientific b.r:r to JUStify upholding 
vvomen's exclusion from the legal profession.10 
Perhaps the most influential evidence of the "natural" hierarchy of the 
races was the cranial measurements collected by the Philadelphia physician, Dr. 
Samuel George Morton.11 Morton attempted to calculate the cranial capacities 
of five major races (Caucasian, Mongoloid, Malay, American Indian, and 
Ethiopian) by measuring over eight hundred skulls from throughout the world. 
In Crania Americana, published in 1839, Morton reported that the Caucasian 
skull measured the largest; American Indians were much smaller; and Negroes 
measured at the bottom.12 Assuming that skull size reflected intelligence, 
Morton's data purported to substantiate the intellectual inferiority of Blacks.13 
Nature and Genetics 
This confusion between what is natural and what is social is particularly 
rampant in matters involving genetics. The desire to have genetically-related 
children, for example, is commonly attributed to nature. In his recent book, 
Children of Choice, John Robertson asserts, "at the most basic level transmis­
sion of one's genes through reproduction is an animal or species urge closely 
linked to the sex drive." 14 Robertson posits the frustration of "their normal 
species urge to procreate"15 as the motivation for couples' use of 
reproduction-assisting technologies and he praises these technologies for freeing 
us from the "luck of the natural lottery."16 His words are reminiscent of the 
opening paragraph of a popular guide to infertility treatment which declared: 
9. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 Stan L 
Rev 581, 597 (1990). 
10. Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley concurring) (emphasis added). 
11. See S.G. Morton, Crania Americana (Pennington 1839). See also Stephen Jay 
Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton 1981 ). 
12. IV!orron, Crania Americana at 147-51 (cited in note 11). 
13. Stephen Jay Gould has demonstrated that Morton's conclusions suffered from 
numerous methodological errors and miscalculations, as well as its erroneous premise 
linking skull size to intellectual ability. Gould, Mismeasure of 1Vfan at 54-69 (cited in note 
11) 0 
14. john Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and The New Reproductive 
Technologies 24 (Princeton 1994 ). 
15. Id at 98. 
16. ld ar 3. 
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"Call it a cosmic spark or spiritual fulfillment, biological need or human 
destiny-the desire for a family rises unbidden from our genetic souls." 17 
Yet, the desire to have genetically-related children is at least influenced, if 
not created, by our culture. Our preoccupa t ion with defining people according 
to their genetic background, which tends to reinforce existing social hierarchies 
and create new ones, may reflect the social dominance of patriarchy. As a 
result, a numbe�· of feminists have advocated :1bandoning the genetic model of 
. J . " . . h 1 j "18 d h l d . . parenthoor, 1ts preoccupation wtc., m2. e seeu, an t e rna e stan ·point i[ 
reflects. Instead, feminists advocate a feminist st::�ndpoint that is nor based on 
notions of superiority and dominance. For example, Mahowald quotes Sara 
Ruddick's advocacy of '"an engaged vision of the world opposed and superior 
ro dominant ways of thinking."'19 Others denne the feminist standpoint as 
one that is anti-hierarchical.20 Overall, feminists resist the trend in science , 
law, and popular culture toward "genetic essentialism,"21 "geneticization,"22 
or "geneticism."23 They question the view that "personal traits are predictable 
and permanent, determined at conception, 'hardwired' into the human constitu­
tion."24 
The way Americans think about genetics was also shaped by the idea of 
racial purity that was supported by law, violence, and social convention for 
over three centuries.ZS The fact that race is inherited influences the meaning 
of the genetic tie in American culture.26 For example, the institution of slav­
ery made the genetic tie to a slave mother critical to determining a child's 
social status, yet legally insignificant to the relationship between male 
slaveowners and their mulatto children.27 Today we generally assume that the 
17. See Sarah Franklin, Deconstructing "Desperateness": The Social Construction of 
Infertility in Popular Representations of New Reproductive Technologies, in Maureen 
McNeil, Ian Varcoe, and Steven Yearley, eds, The New Reproductive Technologies 200, 
207 (St. Martin's 1990). 
18. Joan C. Callahan, ed, Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist Perspectives 11 
(Indiana 1995). See also, for example, Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: 
Ideology and Technology in Patriarchal Society 29-35 (Norton 1989). 
19. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable ar 461 (cited in note 1) (quoting Sara 
Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace 129 (Beacon 1989)). 
20. See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 
UCLA Women's L J 59, SO (1993). 
21. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Dorothy Nelkin, The jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 
Vand L Rev 313, 320-21 (1992). 
22. Abby Lippman, Prenata l Genetic Testing and Screening: Constructing Needs and 
Reinforcing Inequities, 17 Am J L & Med 15, 19 (1990). 
23. See generally Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the 
Broader Harm of Geneticism, 23 J Law Med & Ethics 345 (1995). 
24. Dreyfuss and Nelkin, 45 Yand L Rev at 320-21 (cited in note 21). 
25. See A. Leon Higginbotham, ] r., and Barbara K. Kopyroff, Racial Purity and Inter· 
racial Sex in the Law o/ Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Georgetown L J 1967, 
1967-69 (1989). 
26. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U Chi L Rev 209 (1995). 
27. Id at 225-28. 
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genetic tie creates an enduring bond between parents and their children. 
However, the law sometimes disregards this genetic bond2s and is especially 
likely to do so if the bond is between poor Black mothers and their chil­
dren.29 
Although genetic technology deals with biological facts, genetic technolo­
gies that purport to rely solely on biologically-based factors to determine their 
use also rely on sociaily-dccun:ined factors. For example, we must question 
whether it is s natural a:r.d i;-;cvitabk product of biological fact th;:H "women 
:ather than men undergo p,-!.:nd��d gem:tic tesrs and interventions undertaken in 
response to such tests, wherher these be pregnancy terminations or fetal thera­
pies."30 Cerrainly it is biolog1caliy determined that only women can become 
pregnant and gestate a fetu:;, b12t men are equally able to undergo testing for 
genetic anomalies. It is also not natural that courts, in some cases, invade 
women's autonomy by requiring them to undergo medical interventions for the 
sake of the fetus. According to many feminists, these forced treatment deci­
sions equate women with inert vessels or fetal containers, disregard their own 
reproductive decisions, and value them solely for their capacity to nurture a 
fetus.31 Moreover, these decisions are disproportionately imposed against 
women of color, reflecting the extra disregard for minorities' reproductive deci­
sions.32 Although some people find it natural that women should undergo 
these interventions, even against their will, because it is natural that they 
become pregnant, we do not require fathers to donate bone marrow for the 
sake of their children just because they are naturally fathers.33 In fact, the 
reason courts are more likely to impose requirements on pregnant women has 
to do with the social role of women, not biology. 
Another example of social norms masquerading as biological fact can be 
seen by examining couples' reasons for using in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). IVF 
offers couples who are naturally infertile a way to have a genetically-related 
child. Yet at least half of women who undergo IVF are themselves fertile and 
could conceive a child using artificial insemination. These women usually 
endure the greater risks and expense of IVF simply to enable their infertile 
husbands to have a genetic inheritance.34 
28. Id at 252-64. The law often disregards the genetic tie between parents and children 
tn cases involving so-called surrogate mothers, sperm donors, and unwed fathers. 
29. Id at 2.67-69. 
30. Mahowald, 3 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 442 (cited m note 1). 
31. See, for example, Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's 
Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 Harv Women's L J 9, 57-58 (1987). 
32. See generaily Lisa C. Ikernoro, Furthering the Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in 
the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women, 59 Tenn L Rev 487 (1992); Dorothy 
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and 
the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv L Rev 1419 (1991). 
33. See Robertson, Children o/ Chozce at 193 (cited in note 14). 
34. See Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's Consent to In 
Vitro Fertilization in Male [n(ertil;ty, in He!en Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds, 
Feminist Perspectives in kledical Ethics 169, 171 (Indiana 1992). 
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Nature as an Excuse for Social Inequality 
Categorizing inequality as "natural" is a powerful tool of oppression. 
Perpetrators of the most horrible inhumanity have enlisted supposed biological 
facts as the supreme justification for their domination. Calling the fate of 
subordinated groups a natural misfortune assuages the guilt of those in power 
who thereby assume no responsibility for soci�1! inequality. Eugenic theory 
during the Progressive Era utilized this method to explain poverty and crimi­
nality as inherited traits in order to reinforce an.J justify the prevailing social 
order.35 Despite the biological "facts" advanced to support the government's 
eugenic program, it actually punished those who deviated from social norms. 
Officials claimed that Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in B!tck v Bell/" for example, 
was sterilized due to an alleged mental disability. Historical research reveals, 
however, that she was sterilized because she \Vas poor and had been pregnant 
out of wedlock.37 Eugenicists pretended that the condition of the oppressed 
stemmed from their own incurable, inherited deficiencies rather than political, 
economic, or social realities. As Donald MacKenzie put it, eugenic theory was 
"a way of reading the structure of the social classes onto nature. "33 
In the recent best-seller, The Bell Curve/9 Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray, like the early eugenicists, attempt to provide a biological explanation 
for America's class structure. They claim that intelligence levels differ among 
ethnic groups because of biological fate and that this lower group intelligence 
accounts for social problems, such as poverty, unemployment, and welfare de­
pendency. In other words, they argue that America's social inequality results 
from the biological misfortune of the oppressed and not our failure to support 
egalitarian social programs. 
Conclusion 
There are undeniable biological differences between women and men and 
these differences may in fact be inevitable. Similariy, the color of one's skin is 
a function of one's genetics. However, "differences" between the sexes and the 
races, in many cases, matter solely because they hdve been "transformed into 
social and economic deprivation. 'H0 Therefore, people interested in social 
justice should always test claims of biological difference to see whether or not 
35. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 Tubne L Rev 1945, 
1963-64 ( 1993). 
36. 274 us 200 (1927). 
37. See generally Stephen Jay Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 93 Natural Hist 14 (July 
1984). 
33. Donald A. MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of 
Scientific Knowledge 18 (Edinburgh 1981). 
39. See generally Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles l'vlurray, The Bell Curve: Intelli­
gence and Class Structure in America (Free Press 1994 ). 
40. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence o( 1:erninist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 Yale L J 
1 373, 1396 (1986). 
1996] Biology, justice, and Women's Fate 471 
they actually cloak a social norm that has become transparent because of 
socially imposed gender and racial inequalities. 
